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Does one need to understand why health is valuable in order to find 
enhancement permissible? 
 
 In order to understand whether or not enhancement is ethically 
permissible through a feminist lens, one must first understand why health is 
valuable; otherwise, the point of would be to flee from disease, rather than 
pursue a specific, attainable goal. If there were an attainable goal in mind, 
enhancement could be permissible. However, if enhancement is simply a 
means to avoid amorphous, evolving Illness, then enhancement will never be 
permissible.  
In her book “An Invitation to Feminist Ethics”, Hilde Lindemann 
outlines the problems with traditional, nonfeminist bioethics and explains 
how feminist bioethics is a more comprehensive means of solving bioethical 
problems. The non-feminist, or dominant, mode of bioethics has four main 
characteristics: these are a) abstract rules and principles, b) liberal 
individualism, c) an elite and socially powerful clientele, and d) inattention to 
most forms of oppression (Lindemann 2004, 109). In contrast, feminist 
bioethics is “a bioethics that examines how power in the guise of gender, 
race, and other forms of oppression plays itself out in health care practice 
and the theory that surrounds that practice,” (Lindemann 2004, 117).  As 
such, feminist bioethics tracks the responsibilities of all those involved as 
they correspond to the patient, and draws attention to the three types of 
stories present in any given case – stories of identity, relationship, and values 
(Lindemann 2004, 113). In this way, feminist bioethics emphasizes, “that 
bioethics is something we do together,” (Lindemann 2004, 114). By situating 
people within webs of relationships, feminist bioethics rejects the traditional 
bioethics assumptions, “that people are essentially self-reliant, self-
interested, unconnected to others, and in a position to advocate for what they 
want,” (Lindemann 2004, 114).  In these ways, feminist bioethics allows for 
an understanding of how social groups can oppress each other, (Lindemann 
2004, 116).  
 In his essay “Genetic Interventions and the Ethics of Enhancement on 
Human Beings” Julian Savulescu proposes an answer to the question, “Should 
we use science and medical technology not just to prevent or treat disease, 
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but to intervene at the most basic biological levels to improve biology and 
enhance people’s lives,” (Savulescu 2007, 604)? In answering this question, 
Savulescu argues that enhancement is both permissible and obligatory, 
(Savulescu 2007, 604).  
 The first argument in favor of genetic enhancement is that choosing 
not to enhance is wrong, (Savulescu 2007, 605). While, “some argue that it is 
not wrong to fail to bring about the best state of affairs,” (Savulescu 2007, 
605) in the case of genetic enhancement, where, “there are no other relevant 
moral considerations,” (Savulescu 2007, 605), then such a failure is wrong. 
The second argument in favor of enhancement, consistency, argues that there 
is little to no relevant difference between environmental manipulations and 
genetic enhancement, as both can and do permanently affect one’s genetics, 
(Savulescu 2007, 605). Thirdly, there is no difference between treating 
disease and genetic enhancement: it is the obligation to preserve good health 
that creates a moral obligation to treat disease, and this obligation still 
applies as a reason to promote genetic enhancement, (Savulescu 2007, 606). 
Additionally, one does not need to question why health is valuable – and 
engage in the corresponding philosophical arguments - to understand that 
disease is bad, (Savulescu 2007, 606). In summary, since biology affects one’s 
ability to live well, “biological manipulation to increase opportunity is 
ethical,” (Savulescu 2007, 608).  
 A counterargument to genetic enhancement is eugenics. Savulescu 
rejects this comparison, as eugenics is the imposition of a State vision of 
health, and is enforced through coercion, for the benefit of society and not for 
the benefit of the individual, (Savulescu 2007, 608).  The cornerstone of 
genetic enhancement should always be autonomy; for this reason, for non-
autonomous individuals such as children, genetic intervention should be 
delayed if at all possible, (Savulescu 2007, 608-609). In cases where delay is 
not possible, the decision to enhance should be left to parents, (Savulescu 
2007, 609). Additionally, when contemplating whether or not to enhance 
one’s child, the parents need to make the decision for the benefit of the child, 
to protect the child’s right to an open future, and to increase all possible 
futures, not restrict them, (Savulescu 2007, 609-610).  
 Savulescu addresses five counterarguments to his claim: ‘Playing God 
or Against Nature’, ‘Genetic Discrimination’, ‘The Perfect Child, Sterility and 
Loss of the Mystery of Life’, ‘Against Human Nature’, and ‘Enhancements as 
Self-Defeating,’ (Savulescu 2007, 610-612). In contrast to ‘Playing God or 
Against Nature’, Savulescu argues waiting until the technology of 
advancement has been perfected is akin to being responsible for all of the 
diseases that happen between now and whenever the technology is finally 
2
Sound Decisions: An Undergraduate Bioethics Journal, Vol. 4 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/sounddecisions/vol4/iss1/2
perfected, (Savulescu 2007, 610). In addition, medicine – or rational 
evolution – has already changed the process of evolution, and as such, 
enhancement is a necessity, not a luxury, (Savulescu 2007, 611). As a 
counterpoint to ‘Genetic Discrimination’, Savulescu argues that, “There is no 
necessary connection between enhancement and discrimination, just as 
there is no necessary connection between curing disability and 
discrimination against people with disability,” (Savulescu 2007, 611). 
‘Enhancements are Self-Defeating’ argues that enhancements are only 
valuable if there is relative gain in comparison to everyone else, (Savulescu 
2007, 612). Savulescu argues that there will be many relative and non-
relative qualities to enhancements, (Savulescu 2007, 612). Additionally, 
questions about distributive justice are already a problem for things like 
education and healthcare, and so such questions should not be a barrier to 
the implementation of enhancements, as they are not barriers to people 
receiving education or healthcare, (Savulescu 2007, 612).  
 A feminist bioethicist would have a plethora of issues with Savulescu’s 
argument; I address four issues. The cornerstone of a feminist analysis of 
Savulescu’s argument focuses on how Savulescu understands enhancement 
in the web of relationships that he is a part of, and contrasting that to how 
genetic enhancement would affect those that are not in Savulescu’s same 
social group.  
 Savulescu argues that there is an obligation to preserve good health 
that drives the moral obligation that people have to try and heal one another. 
This observation is faulty, as there is no moral obligation to preserve health, 
but to pursue health. If the true aim of medicine were to preserve health, ten 
every doctor that has ever had a patient become more ill, or die, would have 
failed their moral obligation; this is clearly faulty. To assume that medicine 
and healing is so black and white is to assume that people have a level of 
agency and independent functioning both within and over illness that is 
simply not present. To assume such a premise is to begin to construct a 
hierarchy within the practice of medicine: those who get better are more 
morally permissible than those who cannot recover. Savulescu assumes a 
place of privilege when he assumes that the goal of medicine is perfectly 
healthy bodies: rather the goal of medicine should be to collaborate on 
patient care in order to achieve the best outcome for all involved.  
 In addition to assuming an incorrect stance on the goal of medicine, 
Savulescu also assumes that one does not need to comprehend what level of 
health they wish to attain before attempting to enhance; he argues that 
disease is bad, and the avoidance of this end is enough to justify genetic 
enhancement. However, in assuming that all diseases – and that all ‘negative’ 
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traits – are bad, Savulescu employs an abstract principle to justify removing 
individuals from their present webs of identity in order to ‘cure’ them. By 
blacklisting everything negative, Savulescu ensures that the definition of 
‘negative’ will continue to evolve. It also superimposes a hierarchy onto all 
social groups, ensuring that the character traits that the dominant social 
group believes to be important will endure, while traits of the ‘lower’ 
socioeconomic classes will be eliminated from the population. This would 
result in the eventual elimination of certain types of stories of value, as those 
traits or genes deemed ‘undesirable’ would have been engineered out of the 
population. On the other hand, a defined goal of ‘health’ – such as the 
elimination of Huntington’s, Alzheimer’s, or AIDS – would be a more 
attainable, egalitarian goal and does not allow for the evolution of the 
meaning of ‘negative’. Additionally, such a goal would allow for individuals to 
remain in their current webs of identity, values and relationship while also 
allowing them freedom from debilitating and terminal diseases. Savulescu’s 
use of the word ‘opportunity’ is telling: yes, enhancements would increase 
opportunity (notably he does not use the word ‘health’ here), but 
opportunity for whom? His arguments completely fail to address this 
problem.  
 Thirdly, Savulescu attempts to address a potential counterargument 
by arguing that enhancement and eugenics are different concepts; he does 
this by stating that enhancement is individually-motivated and voluntary, 
while eugenics is driven by the state and citizens are coerced into 
participating. However, such an argument is based on the idea, “that people 
are essentially self-reliant, self-interested, unconnected to others, and in a 
position to advocate for what they want,” (Lindemann 2004, 114). Such a 
conclusion assumes that the State does not oppress particular classes of 
people, whether intentionally or unintentionally, and that everyone in society 
has Savulescu’s same level of privilege. Savulescu’s assumption that 
enhancement would be applied in a societal vacuum ignores the reality of 
existing systemic inequality. [Such ignorance does not create eugenics, but 
rather provides a foundation on which eugenics may be actualized.   
 Finally, Savulescu argues that, “there is no necessary connection 
between enhancement and discrimination, just as there is no necessary 
connection between curing disability and discrimination against people with 
disability,” (Savulescu 2007, 611). He is right in that there is no necessary 
connection between these phenomenon; however, to then claim that, just 
because a connection is not necessary, that such a connection is not there is 
the epitome of privilege. Savulescu completely ignores the existence of, “an 
elite and socially powerful clientele,” (Lindemann 2004) and chooses instead 
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to argue that ‘just because social classes do not have to oppress one another, 
means that oppression does not happen’. In doing so, Savulescu completely 
ignores the concept that individuals have contextual factors in their lives that 
either prevent then from attaining agency, or prevent them from acting on 
the agency that they already have. Furthermore, his argument about 
preexisting distributive injustice not being a barrier to implementing genetic 
enhancement is false: just because unjust systems already exist is insufficient 
justification for the creation of additional unjust systems.  
 Some potential counterarguments to the feminist analysis presented 
are first, the presence of privilege should not be a sufficient reason to justify 
withholding technology. Second, that the implementation and use of genetic 
enhancement technology by a few will pave the way for greater use by a 
larger population. Third, enhancement is a necessity, in order to maximize 
human evolutionary potential and maximize benefits for individuals.  
The rebuttals are as follows: 
 First, the presence of privilege should not be a sufficient reason to 
justify withholding technology, so long as the technology used is 
implemented in such a way that it combats existing oppressive power 
structures and respects the networked, collaborative nature of bioethics. 
Technology is an amoral tool: it is how that tool is implemented that makes it 
ethical or unethical, and under Savulescu’s implementation design genetic 
enhancement would serve to empower oppressive structures, rather than 
dismantle them.  
 Second, the implementation and use of genetic enhancement 
technology by a few will pave the way for greater use by a larger population 
in an uneven way. Technological advances beget technological advances, and 
the use of technology by a few will ensure that by the time the technology 
becomes disseminated there will be a new technology with the same 
distributive justice problems as genetic enhancement. Such a design merely 
upholds existing oppressive structures amongst social groups, while 
gradually and disproportionately improving the lives of those in other 
populations.  
 Thirdly, human evolution and healthcare occur at a systematic or 
group level, not an individual level. The implementation of genetic 
enhancement on an individual level would not serve human evolution; rather 
it would serve elite groups in such a way that would allow them to remain 
elite.  
 If enhancement is to be implemented in the way that Julian Savulescu 
intends, in order to flee from disease, preserve health, and promote 
opportunity, then such medical technology cannot be ethically implemented 
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when investigated through a feminist theory lens. Counterarguments 
regarding individual gain and technological and evolutionary advancement 
are equally problematic, because they would also support existing 
oppressive power structures. In the existing system, genetic enhancement 
would not serve to reform the world as much as it would reinforce all of the 
ethical issues currently plaguing healthcare systems. In conclusion, one 
needs to understand the definition of health being proposed by the prevailing 
power structure, in order to understand whether or not the technology 
proposed is going to uphold the injustice in the existing power structure, or 
reform it.  
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